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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






LA MAR GUNN, 








On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-13-cv-00163) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2015 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 







 La Mar Gunn appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint.  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 In January 2013, Gunn filed a pro se qui tam action under the False Claims Act 
(“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730 et seq., on behalf of the United States.1  He was granted leave 
to proceed with the action in forma pauperis.  Gunn alleged violations against appellees 
for civil fraud under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1964.  In particular, Gunn alleged that appellees Nikole Shelton and Credit Suisse 
Group AG committed fraud and engaged in unlawful residential mortgage practices by 
intentionally altering securitization documents filed with the Internal Revenue Service 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Gunn further asserted that appellees have 
“tricked” courts throughout this country into accepting these counterfeit documents. 
 In accordance with § 3730(b)(2), the Clerk’s Office opened the case under seal.  
After the Government advised the court that it declined to intervene, the District Court 
proceeded to screen and review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  
Initially, the court noted Gunn’s pro se status and acknowledged that his pleadings would 
be liberally construed and his complaint held to less stringent standards than one drafted 
by an attorney.  See D. Ct. Mem. Op. at 3.  Even with such liberal construction, however, 
the District Court concluded that the complaint was subject to summary dismissal given 
the simple fact that Gunn, who is not an attorney, was not qualified to represent the 
United States.  The District Court further noted that Gunn’s failure to comply with 
                                              
1  The FCA makes it unlawful to knowingly submit a fraudulent claim to the 
Government.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 331-32 
(3d Cir. 2005).  A qui tam action permits a private party, a relator, to file suit on behalf of 
the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the Government, and rewards 
a successful plaintiff with part of the recovery.  See United States ex rel. Zizic v. 
Q2Administrators, 728 F.3d 228, 231 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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several FCA service and filing requirements justified dismissal of his complaint, as did 
the fact that the complaint failed to set out a cognizable FCA claim.  See id. at 5-6. 
 Gunn’s attempt to raise a RICO claim fared no better as the District Court 
concluded that nothing in the FCA allows a private citizen to file such a claim on behalf 
of the United States.  Moreover, Gunn could not represent the Government with respect 
to any such claim.  The court therefore entered an order dismissing the complaint in its 
entirety pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).  The court further noted that the only way Gunn 
could attempt to cure the defects would be to obtain counsel and file an amended 
complaint.  Gunn was thus afforded an opportunity to obtain counsel to enter an 
appearance and file an amended complaint.  Gunn was warned that his failure to do so 
would result in the Clerk being directed to close his case.  After considering Gunn’s 
reconsideration motion wherein he requested leave to file an amended pro se complaint, 
the District Court entered an order denying the motion and directing the Clerk to close 
the case.  This timely appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissal of Gunn’s complaint under § 1915(e).  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We agree that Gunn’s pro se complaint 
was subject to dismissal.  While it does not appear that we have had occasion to address 
the issue, every circuit that has is in agreement that a pro se litigant may not pursue a qui 
tam action on behalf of the Government.  See United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. 
Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2008); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 873-74 
 4 
(11th Cir. 2008); Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1126-27 
(9th Cir. 2007); United States ex rel. Lu v. Ou, 368 F.3d 773, 775-76 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(citing also United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 6-7 (8th Cir. 1951)), rev’d on other 
grounds, 556 U.S. 928 (2008); Jones v. Jindal, 409 F. App’x 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(unpublished); United States ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 237 F. App’x 802, 
802 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). 
 There can be little doubt that the United States remains the real party in interest in 
this action.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 
934-35 (2009); Mergent Servs., 540 F.3d at 93.  As set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1654, “[i]n all 
courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally 
or by counsel ….”  The federal courts “have routinely adhered to the general rule 
prohibiting pro se plaintiffs from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative 
capacity.”  Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664-65 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting 
cases); see also Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(holding that parent and guardian could not litigate pro se on behalf of his children).  
Gunn does not allege that he has a personal interest or injury to vindicate on account of 
appellees’ alleged actions.  As such, we do not hesitate to conclude that the District Court 
did not err in concluding that Gunn may not maintain this qui tam action in his pro se 
capacity as a relator on behalf of the United States. 
 Despite Gunn’s repeated contentions that he is best suited to pursue this qui tam 
action given his special “securitization” knowledge, he argues on appeal that the District 
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Court should have appointed counsel for him in order to allow his action to proceed.  
However, appellee Credit Suisse Group AG is correct in its assertion that Gunn never 
requested the appointment of counsel, and instead insisted that he is more qualified than 
most attorneys to pursue this action on behalf of the Government.  Surely Gunn cannot 
mean to imply that the District Court is obligated to sua sponte consider the appointment 
of counsel in every qui tam action filed by a litigant in a pro se capacity, and we would 
refuse to impose such an obligation on the District Court in any event. 
 Gunn likewise cannot be heard to argue that the District Court committed 
reversible error in failing to construe his pro se filings liberally.  The District Court 
specifically noted Gunn’s pro se status and its obligation to construe his pleadings 
liberally.  See D. Ct. Mem. Op. at 3 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).  
Moreover, as appellee Credit Suisse Group AG notes, the District Court’s dispositive 
holding was based on the fact that Gunn may not represent the interest of the United 
States in a pro se capacity – not on any construction of his pleading or on the underlying 
merits of the action.  It is for this same reason that we conclude the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to afford Gunn a further opportunity to amend the complaint 
after having previously granted him leave to obtain counsel for the purpose of filing an 
amended complaint, and warned him of possible dismissal.  See Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Given the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment and have no 
need to consider the appropriateness of the District Court’s alternative justifications for 
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dismissal of Gunn’s complaint.  Gunn’s numerous motions for “Mandatory Judicial 
Notice” pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201 are denied as such motions are not appropriate on 
appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 10.2 
                                              
2  Appellee Credit Suisse Group AG asserts that Gunn has included unfounded and ad 
hominem attacks against the District Court and counsel in his appellate brief, and requests 
that the Court admonish Gunn for such statements.  The Court agrees that Gunn’s status 
as a pro se litigant does not excuse him from exhibiting an acceptable level of civility.  
Gunn would be well advised to draft future filings accordingly. 
